The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we nd that preferenced trades pay higher spreads, however, they do not generate higher dealer pro ts. Internalized trades pay lower, not higher, spreads. We do not nd a relation between the extent of preferencing or internalization, and spreads across stocks. These results do not lend support to the`collusion' hypothesis but are consistent with a`costly search and trading relationships' hypothesis.
Introduction
A large academic, legal, and regulatory controversy has arisen about the e ect of the practices of preferencing and internalization on the quality of execution in dealership markets, especially the Nasdaq. This controversy has its roots in two papers by , and Christie, Harris, and Schultz 1994 allege that the Nasdaq market makers have engaged in tacit collusion and argue that institutional practices like preferencing, internalization, and best execution may allow the sustenance of tacit collusion.
In this recent controversy about the adverse e ects of preferencing and internalization on the quality of execution in dealership markets, di erent authors have de ned the terms preferencing and internalization in di erent w ays. In this paper, we follow the de nition of preferencing by Godek 1996 and Huang and Stoll 1996 , and de ne preferencing as`the act of directing an order to a market maker who is not posting the best price but who has agreed in advance to execute the order at best quoted price.' Under this de nition, preferencing is synonymous with best execution.
Although there is an extensive academic debate about best execution, preferencing, and internalization, this debate has been hampered by the lack o f a n y direct evidence of the e ect of preferencing and internalization on execution costs in dealership markets. 4 This paper provides direct and comprehensive evidence of the e ect of preferencing and internalization on quality of execution and the pro tability of market making in a competitive dealership market using a rich dataset from the London Stock Exchange LSE.
The LSE is a competitive dealership market similar to Nasdaq, and like Nasdaq it allows the practices of best execution and preferencing of order ow. Although these two dealership markets share many similar characteristics, there exist some important institutional di erences as well. Although, like on Nasdaq,`soft dollar' arrangements where the brokerage rms receive an agreed amount of commission business in exchange for research and other services are legal on the LSE, it is illegal to make cash payments to purchase the order ow. In terms of competition in market making, on the Nasdaq, there exist over 400 market makers who exhibit considerable diversity in terms of the retail, institutional, wholesale, and regional nature of their businesses Schwartz 1991 and Kleidon and Willig 1995. In contrast, on the LSE there exist only 21 market makers. A great majority of them compete for business primarily in the large FTSE-100 stocks while a few specialize in making a market in the small stocks. In terms of the composition of the order ow, a larger proportion of turnover on the LSE seems to begenerated by institutions who trade in large sizes. Finally, unlike the Nasdaq, LSE has no mandatory tick size and allows decimal trading.
Our dataset identi es the party broker or institutional investor who initiates the trade, the market maker who executes the trade, and contemporaneous quotes posted by every dealer which enables us to determine whether a trade is preferenced and or internalized.
Our empirical results indicate that, on average, preferenced trades receive w orse execution than the nonpreferenced trades while internalized trades receive better execution than noninternalized trades, after controlling for factors like size of trade, width of the inside spread, short-run volatility, illiquidity, etc. This nding holds for trades up to one NMS for which quotes are rm as well as for the overall order ow and are robust to delays in reporting of trades.
In terms of market making pro tability, we nd that dealers earn, on average, a dealer pro t" before subtracting costs of market making like salaries, technology, cost of capital, etc. which is not statistically di erent from zero. It is lower than that earned by the specialists on the NYSE So anos 1995 and that estimated to beearned by dealers on the Nasdaq Huang and Stoll 1996, and appears inconsistent with collusive behavior on the part of the market makers.
When we decompose market makers' overall trading pro t into a spread margin the execution component and a position margin the price movement component, we nd that dealers earn an e ective half-spread of 23 basis points and a position margin of -27 basis points leading to a net trading loss of 4 basis points perPound Sterling of public turnover.
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These low margins seem to be partly driven by the fact that the relative tick size is much smaller on the LSE relative to the US exchanges. 6 When we analyze the pro tability of executing order ows of di erent size categories, we nd that market makers make money 24 basis points on small trades, break even -1 basis points on large trades but lose money -16 basis points on medium-size trades. This suggests that medium-size trades are most informative, a nding that directly corroborates Barclay and Warner's 1993`stealth trading' hypothesis. 7 We examine whether a particular type of order ow e.g., preferenced versus nonpreferenced, and internalized versus noninternalized is more pro table to the market makers. Towards that end, we regress the trading pro t of each dealer in each stock on the proportions of the di erent types of order ows executed by that dealer in that stock. We do not nd that any particular type of order ow is more pro table than any other type of order ow. Thus, even if the dealers charge a higher spread for preferenced trades and for noninternalized trades, cross-sectionally we do not nd that dealers who execute a larger proportion of preferenced or noninternalized order ows earn higher trading pro ts. If we assume a trade reporting delay of ve minutes, we nd at best a marginal relationship between the fraction of preferenced order ow executed by the dealers and their trading pro ts.
Since the e ect of the degree of preferencing in a stock on the overall execution quality for that stock is an important regulatory issue, we examine the relation between the average execution quality in a given stock and the degree of preferencing and internalization in that stock. We use the average inside spread and average e ective spread as measures of execution quality. In both cases, cross-sectionally we do not nd a relation between the degree of preferencing in a stock and the quoted inside spread or e ective spread in that stock. These results also hold if we assume that that all trades are reported with a delay of ve minutes.
Overall, these results are contrary to the predictions of the`collusion' hypothesis and the`quotes are free options' hypothesis described in Section I below. However, they are consistent with the hypothesis that there are costs of negotiating quotes and that customers have trading relationships with dealers.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses various hypotheses on preferencing, best execution and internalization. Section II describes the data and Section III discusses the results on quality of execution for di erent types of order ows. Section IV computes dealers' trading pro ts and examines if a particular type of order ow is more pro table than other. Section V examines whether di erences in the extent of preferencing and internalization in stocks are related to the average inside spread and e ective spread in that stock. Section VI o ers concluding remarks.
I. Motivation, Theory, and Testable Implications
Given the belief that preferencing, internalization, and best execution can worsen the quality of execution in dealership markets, we review the various theories that have been put forward in the market microstructure literature that are of relevance to the debate on preferencing and internalization.
A. Preferencing and Collusion
A n umber of papers e.g., Battalio and Holden 1996 , Dutta and Madhavan 1997 , and Kandel and Marx 1998 argue that preferencing facilitates collusion. While the models di er in their exact details, in general, they are similar in maintaining that preferencing reduces incentives to cut prices because market makers who undercut other market makers cannot attract the preferenced order ow which is captive. Consequently, these papers argue that preferencing results in higher bid-ask spreads for the order ow as a whole with the quality of execution for preferenced order ow being worse than that for nonpreferenced order ow. Hence, dealers make higher pro ts on preferenced order ow. Additionally, these models imply that as the extent of preferencing increases, the inside spread widens, the average execution quality w orsens, and dealers' pro ts increase.
B. Preferencing and the Free Option in Quotes
The essence of this viewpoint lies in the notion that posted quotes are free options written by the dealers Copeland and Galai 1983. In particular, when information arrives and the dealer is not able to change his quotes immediately, the quotes may be picked o . 8 If the posting of best quotes leads to writing such free options, dealers who do not post best quotes but who can attract the public order ow may bene t. When a trade is routed to a dealer who is not posting the best quotes preferenced, the dealer gets to execute the trade without giving away this free option. For such a trade, the dealer may wish to o er better execution by sharing a part of the savings from not having to give away the free option. Thus, the`free option' hypothesis, like the`collusion' hypothesis, implies that preferenced trades should bemore pro table than nonpreferenced trades. In contrast to the`collusion' hypothesis, it implies that the execution quality is better for preferenced trades. It also suggests that dealer pro ts should be higher in stocks where a larger proportion of order ow is preferenced. The`free option' hypothesis, however, does not o er any clearcut implications as to how an increase in the extent of preferenced order ow a ects the average spread or the average execution quality.
C. Preferencing, Costly Negotiation with Heterogeneous Dealers, and Customer-Dealer Relationships
An important feature of dealership markets that has received less attention in the theoretical literature is the presence of large institutional traders who can negotiate trades and thus receive price improvement relative to the quotes. These institutional traders trade regularly with one or more of the broker-dealers. As a consequence, they may choose to go to a dealer posting the best quotes or to their regular dealer.
Since the posted quotes are valid only for a certain quantity and since prices for all larger sized trades need to be negotiated, trading in dealership markets involves search costs as the cost negotiating and obtaining the best price improvement relative to the quotes is nonzero. Harris 1993 , Kleidon and Willig 1995 , and Grossman et al. 1997 argue that the costly search feature of such markets may explain why there is di erential execution of small and large trades. Rhodes-Kropf 1997 presents a model where renegotiation occurs and shows that this leads to wide posting of quotes followed by price improvement for customers who can negotiate quotes. This leads to di erential execution for di erent customers. In this view of dealer markets, dealers are heterogeneous because of inventory di erences. Consequently, as in Ho and Stoll 1983, quotes are informative about dealer inventories and indicate a greater willingness to trade on one side.
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If dealership markets involve costly search and negotiation, routing of the order ow to a regular dealer who may or may not be posting the best quote occurs when the customer desires immediacy and does not wish to search. Alternatively, a customer who does not desire immediacy and is willing to search for the best price will search and will generally execute with dealers who post best quotes on the relevant side of the touch. If posting the best quote on one side of the touch indicates a greater willingness to transact in that direction due to, say, inventory reasons, then market makers on the relevant side of the touch may o er a price improvement from the posted quotes for such nonpreferenced trades. Consequently, the quality of execution will be worse for preferenced trades for which a dealer may only match the best price relative to nonpreferenced trades for which a dealer may o er an improvement o ver the best price. However, this does not translate into greater pro ts for dealers on preferenced trades. Since dealers are heterogeneous, a dealer who accepts a trade when he is not posting the best quote is accepting a trade that moves his inventory position away from the desired level. This would make preferenced trades less pro table than nonpreferenced trades. Also, it would imply that cross-sectionally stocks with more preferencing have worse execution quality less price improvement. However, the implication for the cross-sectional distribution of dealer pro ts is ambiguous as the higher spreads could be eroded by the inventory di erences. We summarize in Table I the implications of these hypotheses for preferenced trades.
D. Internalization
Internalization represents a situation where the broker routes a trade to a dealer belonging to the same rm. To the extent that internalization represents captive order ow and facilitates collusive practices, the implications of the`collusion' hypothesis hold internalized order ow receives worse execution while dealers make higher pro ts. Thè free option in quotes' hypothesis has no implications for internalized order ow.
In our data, we observe dealer and broker codes. Hence, we view order ow as being internalized when these two codes are identical, i.e., the broker belongs to the same rm as the market maker. Unfortunately, this order ow represents not only captive order ow but also order ow directly negotiated by large institutions. These institutions have access to dealers' quotes and can directly negotiate with them. Since there is no broker involved, the dealer is presumed to be both the dealer and the broker. Clearly, such order ow does not represent captive order ow.
If most of the internalized order ow represents such directly negotiated order ow, then any di erences in the quality of execution represent di erences in the abilities of institutions and brokers in the costly search process. Since, a priori, there is no theory as to why dealers ought to have higher pro ts for either category of order ow, this hypothesis implies that a better execution quality for internalized order ow must translate into lower dealer pro ts and vice versa.
II. Data Description
We begin with a short description of the trading system used on the LSE, and then describe the data used in this study.
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The LSE is a competitive dealership market where several market makers post quotes in a stock and trades are done by negotiations over the phone. The orders can be executed by any market maker, regardless of her current quotes. For orders that do not exceed the quoted size, the market maker must at least match the best quotes on the screen. For orders larger than the quoted size, no such rule applies and the prices can benegotiated freely. Arrangements by brokers to send order ow to any one particular market maker are legal. In contrast to Nasdaq, no direct cash payments can be received for such arrangements. However, research and other services may beprovided to ensure that brokers route order ow towards a particular dealer.
Our dataset provides the details of quotes posted by and transactions executed by all market makers in all stocks during the month of August 1994. Before going into details of the dataset, we examine how the trading activity in August 1994 compares with the rest of the months in 1994. The average daily public turnover in UK and Irish equities in 1994 was about $1.4 billion minimum $1.2 billion in December and maximum $1.9 billion in January while that in August 1994 was $1.42 billion.
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On average in 1994 there were about 37,000 trades perday minimum 29,000 in Decemberand maximum 53,000 in January while in August 1994 there were 38,000 trades per day. The average value per trade in 1994 was about $65,000 minimum $58,000 in March and maximum $67,000 in October while that in August 1994 was $64,000. With respect to the volatility of FTSE-100 index, the month of August 1994 also appears similar to the rest of the year. This suggests that although we have a relatively short time span of data, the sample period is representative o f a t ypical month in 1994.
For the month of August 1994, our dataset identi es the following:
the name of the stock traded, the quotes bid and ask prices posted by each market maker registered in a stock and the quantities for which these quotes are rm, the identities of the buyer and seller participating in each transaction, the dealing capacity of buyer and seller in each transaction if they acted as an agent representing a public order, or as principal and possibly market maker, allowing each public trade to be classi ed as either a public buy or sell, the transaction price, the date and time of the transaction, the quantity traded as reported by the buyer and as reported by the seller.
This dataset identi es the quotes and transactions of all market makers at all points in time and is richer than that used by Reiss and Werner 1993 , 1998 and Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan 1998 in some important respects. The dataset allows us to distinguish whether a public trade was routed by a broker to a dealer belonging to the same rm internalized or not. Equally importantly, the dataset identi es market makers and brokers across stocks. The latter feature allows us to distinguish portfolio trades executed by a dealer from other trades. This distinction is important because in case of a portfolio trade the dealer's commission is not included in the reported price i.e., it is paid separately while that on individual trades is included in the transaction price. Clearly, the presence of unidenti ed portfolio trades biases the estimates of quality of execution.
The distinction between portfolio trades and individual trades is of some importance in understanding the e ective spread paid on trades and in addressing the issue of preferencing. When a trader wishes to trade in an individual stock, he nds out the best price by looking at the screen. He then decides whether to negotiate the trade with a dealer posting the best price or with a dealer not posting the best price i.e., preference the trade. By contrast, when a trader, who would typically be an index fund manager or a cash-index arbitrageur, negotiates a portfolio trade with a dealer, his focus is on the commission 15 to 20 basis points he has to pay and not on whether that market maker is posting the best price in some or all stocks in the portfolio. Clearly, the issue of preferencing is less relevant in the case of a portfolio trade, and therefore, we report most of our results with and without the inclusion of portfolio trades.
While our dataset lists transaction details for all stocks on the LSE, for computational tractability, we focus attention on trading in the most liquid 102 stocks.
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The names of the stocks in our sample are listed in Appendix A. The total public turnover in our sample stocks during August 1994 is worth $13.8 billions about $620 millions per day which is about 50 percent of public turnover in all of the UK and Irish equities in August 1994. In addition, in our sample there is $5.8 billions worth of interdealer trading.
We segregate trades into portfolio trades and individual trades as follows. We de ne a trade in a stock as a part of a portfolio trade if we nd that the trade is executed at the touch midprice and if the same market maker and broker also report trades in ve or more other stocks within two minutes on either side of that trade. Out of the total public turnover of $13.8 billions, we estimate that $2.6 billions consist of portfolio trades while the remaining $11.2 billions consist of non portfolio or individual trades. Since our algorithm to distinguish portfolio trades may not be fully accurate, we report our results with and without portfolio trades.
In our sample, there are a total of 19 market makers who post quotes and trade in some or all of the stocks. In general, the larger market makers post quotes in all stocks, while the smaller market makers post quotes in about 60-95 stocks. When we rank the market makers in descending order of their public turnover, we nd that the top seven market makers execute about 90 percent of the public turnover. Table II presents the distribution of stock prices, quoted spreads, inside spreads, and e ective spreads for the full sample and ten size deciles. In our sample, the mean share price is $5.13 minimum $0.63, maximum $13.54. The mean quoted spread is 125 basis points, while the mean inside spread is 64 basis points. This indicates that many market makers are on one side of the touch the inside spread formed by lowest ask and highest bid, a fact documented in greater detail in Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan 1998. In our sample, the mean e ective spread is 54 basis points, suggesting an average price improvement of 5 basis points relative t o t h e respective side of the inside spread.
On the LSE, dealers who are making market in a stock are required to post quotes that are rm for the Normal Market Size or the NMS de ned as 2.5 percent of average daily trading volume in that stock. Thus, NMS depends on trading activity in a particular stock and therefore varies across stocks. In our empirical work, we pool crosssectional and time-series data. To facilitate comparison of trade sizes across stocks, we de ne trade size as relative t o a verage trade size in each stock. For much of our empirical work, in addition to the results for all public trades, we also report results for trades upto one NMS size.
In our sample, about 71 percent of trades are executed by market makers not posting the best quotes preferenced while 29 percent are nonpreferenced.
13
With respect to internalization, we nd that about 62 percent of trades are internalized i.e., the market maker and the broker belong to the same rm. The average trade size of internalized trades is about $280,000, which suggests that a large proportion of these trades are from institutional investors who prefer to deal directly with the market makers.
14 As described in the introduction, since each public trade can be classi ed as preferenced or nonpreferenced and internalized or noninternalized, we divide public trades into four categories. Out of $13.8 billions worth of public trades, we nd that $6.2 billions 45 percent are preferenced and internalized P&I, $3.6 billions 26 percent are preferenced and noninternalized P&N-I, $2.3 billions 16.7 percent are nonpreferenced and internalized N-P&I, and $1.7 billions 12.3 percent are nonpreferenced and noninternalized N-P&N-I. If we exclude portfolio trades from our sample, we nd that $11.2 billions worth of individual trades are distributed in similar proportions across the four types of order ows. In particular, we observe that $5.1 billions 45.5 percent worth of trades are P&I, $2.95 billions 26.3 percent are P&N-I, $1.85 billions 16.5 percent are N-P&I and $1.30 billions 11.7 percent are N-P&N-I.
Having described the data, we proceed with the investigation of e ect of preferencing and internalization on quality of execution and pro tability of market making.
III. Execution Quality
This section compares the quality of execution of trades which di er in terms of whether they are preferenced or not, and whether they are internalized or not. We measure the execution quality in terms of the e ective half-spread the di erence between the transaction price and the touch midprice as a percentage of the touch midprice. For example, if the touch in a particular stock is 105-95 pence and a public buy occurs at 103 pence, then our measure of execution quality equals 103 , 100=100 or three percent. 15 If the hypothesis that preferenced order ow receives worse execution is correct, it should be re ected in the e ective half-spread divided by the touch mid-point. However, to undertake such a test, we need to control for other factors that a ect the quality of execution as well. Table III shows, for all trades, the correlation coe cients between Table III about here the dummies indicating whether a trade is preferenced and or internalized, trade size as a fraction of the mean trade size in that stock, touch size touch divided by the touch midpoint, and a variable called market maker imbalance described below which captures the relative propensity of market makers to trade on one side of the market. Table IIIindicates that the internalized trades both preferenced and nonpreferenced are positively correlated with size, suggesting that these are likely to be trades directly negotiated by institutional investors with the market makers.
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To understand the impact of preferencing and internalization on execution quality, we run a regression of the e ective half-spread against three dummies P&I, P&N-I, and N-P&I, the relative size of the trade Size, the size of the touch Touch and the market maker imbalance MMimbal. For a public buy sell, we de ne the market maker imbalance as the numberof dealers on the ask bid side of the touch minus the number of dealers on the bid ask side of the touch. When this variable is positive, there exist more market makers on the relevant side of touch than on the opposite side of the touch and one expects a better quality of execution i.e., lower e ective half-spread. To control further for cross-sectional heterogeneity across stocks, we allow for a dummy variable for each stock xed e ects. where Exqual is the execution quality e ective half-spread, t s is the t th transaction in stock s, and D s is the stock speci c dummy. P&I ts ;s is a dummy for preferenced and internalized trades, P&N-I ts ;s is a dummy for preferenced and noninternalized trades, and N-P&I ts ;s is a dummy for nonpreferenced and internalized trades. It is clear that compared to the benchmark of nonpreferenced and noninternalized N-P&N-I trades, both preferenced and internalized P&I as well as nonpreferenced and internalized N-P&I trades receive better execution by 3.81 basis points and 5.62 basis points, respectively. Compared to the average half inside spread of 32 basis points in our sample see Table II , this represents a price improvement of 12 percent to 18 percent of the half inside spread. This suggests that institutions who directly negotiate trades with market makers or brokers who route the order ow to their own market makers are able to obtain signi cant price improvement for their trades.
Among trades that are internalized, those which are preferenced P&I receive l o wer price improvement by 1.81 = 5.62 3.81 basis points compared to those which are not N-P&I. This lower price improvement is likely due to the fact that P&I trades are more likely to arrive at a time when the dealer for inventory reasons may prefer not to take the trades. The lower price improvement nding also holds for noninternalized trades which constitute 61 percent of all trades, preferenced and noninternalized P&N-I trades receive w orse execution by 0.2 basis points compared to nonpreferenced and noninternalized N-P&N-I trades. Thus, we nd that preferenced trades receive worse execution compared to nonpreferenced trades irrespective of whether the trade is internalized or not. However, since the average half-spread in our sample is about 32 basis points, the di erence in the quality of execution is`economically' signi cant primarily for the internalized trades.
Several other variables turn out to be signi cant a s w ell. Quality of execution seems to be a nonlinear function of size. The slope coe cient of size is negative while that of the square of size is positive suggesting that the quality of execution improves with size but at a decreasing rate. The fact that execution quality improves as the trade size increases albeit at a decreasing rate is contrary to the typical inventory or asymmetric information based models but is consistent with the presence of xed costs order processing, administration involved in executing a trade. When the touch is wider potentially re ecting more uncertainty, the customers pay a higher e ective half-spread. 19 Finally, the market maker imbalance variable has a negative slope coe cient which is intuitive. When there is a greater number of market makers on the ask bid side of the touch than on the bid ask side of the touch, more dealers are keen on selling stock than buying stock. Thus, public trades that are in a direction desired by the market makers, e.g., public buy sell trades, receive better execution.
We rerun Regression 1 for zero to one NMS size trades and nd results similar to that for the overall order ow see Table IV rst panel, rst column. In particular, we nd that preferenced and internalized P&I trades receive w orse execution compared to nonpreferenced and internalized N-P&I trades, while preferenced and noninternalized P&N-I trades receive w orse execution compared to nonpreferenced and noninternalized N-P&N-I trades. Thus, the nding that preferenced trades receive worse execution and internalized trades receive better execution also holds for small-size trades, in which regulators have particular interest. We conduct some robustness checks for our results. We examine the sensitivity o f o u r results to delayed reporting of trades which may a ect the classi cation of preferenced trades but not internalized trades. We rerun Regression 1 by assuming that all trades are reported with a delay of ve minutes. We nd that overall about six percent of the trades get reclassi ed from preferenced to nonpreferenced and vice versa. However, as the second panel in Table IV shows, the nding that preferenced trades receive worse execution compared to nonpreferenced trades and that internalized trades receive better execution compared to noninternalized trades remains unchanged for the overall as well as the zero to one NMS category of order ow. This suggests that our ndings are not sensitive to misclassi cation due to potentially delayed reporting of trades.
We also divide our sample stocks in ve touch quintiles and rerun Regression 1. The third panel in Table IV reports the results for overall regression for stocks in touch quintile 1 smallest, touch quintile 3 intermediate, and touch quintile 5 largest. We observe that preferenced order ow receives worse execution and internalized order ow receives better execution across all touch quintiles. The price improvement for internalized order ow seems to be monotone in the size of the average touch with stocks in the largest average touch quintile receiving the most price improvement. The results for the zero to one NMS category across the touch quintiles not reported are similar as well. This suggests that our ndings are robust across di erent touch quintiles.
To examine the sensitivity of these ndings to the presence of portfolio trades, we repeat Regression 1 using $11.2 billions worth of individual trades. Table V sum-Table V about here marizes the ndings when portfolio trades are excluded from our sample. Comparison of second column of the rst panel of Tables IV and V shows that when we exclude the portfolio trades, the magnitude of price improvement o ered to internalized trades increases from 3.81 basis points to 6.32 basis points for P&I trades, and from 5.62 basis points to 8.76 basis points for N-P&I trades. By contrast, in the case of noninternalized trades, although the quality of execution received by P&N-I trades becomes less worse, it continues to remain worse than that received by the benchmark N-P&N-I trades. Thus, the nding that preferenced trades receive w orse execution compared to nonpreferenced trades and that internalized trades receive better execution compared to noninternalized trades continues to hold. This nding remains robust to delayed reporting of trades and holds across di erent touch quintiles which suggests that our nding is not sensitive to the presence of unidenti ed portfolio trades in the data.
To summarize, we nd that preferenced trades receive worse execution than nonpreferenced trades, irrespective of whether the trades are internalized or not. Also, internalized trades receive better execution than noninternalized trades, irrespective of whether the trade is preferenced or nonpreferenced. The evidence that internalized order ow receives better execution than noninternalized order ow is inconsistent with thè collusion' hypothesis which suggests that internalized order ow is captive and therefore should receive worse execution. The nding that preferenced order ow receives worse execution compared with nonpreferenced order ow is opposite of the prediction of thè free option in quotes' hypothesis see top panel of Table I . However, it is consistent with the`collusion' hypothesis and the`negotiation with heterogeneous dealers' hypothesis. In an e ort to distinguish between these two hypotheses, we examine the relative pro tability of di erent t ypes of order ows.
IV. Dealer Pro ts
This section measures trading pro ts of the dealers gross trading revenues of the dealers before subtracting any costs of market making and examines whether these pro ts are related to the composition of the order ow they execute. 2 To obtain the trading pro ts of dealers we value the starting inventory I s0 and ending inventory I sTs at the prevailing touch mid-point. This is because there is no reason to believe that the quote mid-point is systematically biased upwards or downwards. Moreover, since dealers on the LSE make market in a numberof stocks, errors in individual stock v alues cancel out across a portfolio of stocks this is the usual diversi cation argument. We also assume that the beginning inventory is zero, which implies that we are focusing on the pro ts made due to transactions over this period as opposed to pro ts due to a revaluation of the initial inventory. Before examining the pro tability of di erent types of order ow, we estimate the mean overall trading pro t earned by the dealers in our stocks see Appendix B. We nd that although the dealers charge an average spread margin of 23 basis points, overall they lose 4 basis points perPound Sterling of public turnover. When we examine the pro tability of executing small-0-1 NMS, medium-1-6 NMS, and large-6+ NMS size trades, we nd that dealers make a mean overall trading pro t of 24 basis points on small-size trades and break even -1 basis points on large-size trades. In contrast, the dealers lose 16 basis points on medium-size trades. As the spreads charged on all the three categories are very similar, the di erences in the mean overall trading pro ts are primarily due to di erences in the degree of informativeness of order ows of di erent size categories. Since the dealers make a trading loss on medium-size trades, it suggests that these trades are most informative, a nding directly corroborative of the`stealth trading' hypothesis proposed in Barclay and Warner 1993. We know from Section III that the dealers earn a higher spread margin on the preferenced and noninternalized trades. In the following regression we examine whether a particular type of order ow is more pro table than any other type of order ow. Towards that end, we regress the trading pro t of each dealer in each stock on the fraction by v alue of di erent t ypes of order ows executed by that dealer in that stock. Speci cally, w e run the following regression with xed e ects: The stock dummies control for stock-speci c e ects such as volatility, turnover, touch, price, number of market makers, etc.
In our trading pro t calculation, we v alue the ending inventory at the touch mid price. An alternative approach is to allow the dealer to sell the nal inventory to the public and earn an e ective half-spread on the nal inventory. For the sake of robustness, we recompute dealers' trading pro ts assuming that the dealers earn half-spread on their ending inventory. We also recompute the fractions of di erent types of trades assuming that trades are reported with a delay of ve minutes. Thus, in total we run four di erent versions of Regression 4, namely, with half-spread, without half-spread, with contemporaneous reporting of trades and with a ve minute delay in reporting of trades. Table VI  about here   Table VI summarizes the results of the four di erent versions of Regression 4. We nd that in general dealer pro ts are not consistently related to the fraction of any particular type of order ow across all four versions. For example, in case of no reporting delay i.e., contemporaneous touch case and where dealers earn average e ective halfspread on ending inventory, the fraction of nonpreferenced and internalized order ow i s negatively related to dealer pro ts. This is intuitive since the dealers o er the maximum price improvement charge the lowest spread to these trades. However, this variable does not come out signi cant in the other three versions of Regression 4. Similarly, in the case of ve minute delayed reporting of trades and without half-spread, the fractions of preferenced and internalized trades, preferenced and noninternalized trades, and interdealer trades come out signi cantly related to dealer pro ts. Once again, the positive relationship between fractions of preferenced trades and dealer pro ts is intuitive since these trades pay a higher spread. However, in the other three versions of Regression 4, these variables do not come out signi cant. Taken together, the evidence in Table VI fails to show a consistent relationship between trading pro ts of the dealers and the composition of their order ow. Moreover, when occasionally a statistically signi cant relationship between the dealer pro ts and the composition of their order ow is observed, the changes in adjusted R 2 are small, suggesting that economically the magnitude of the e ect is not very signi cant.
The regression results not reported when portfolio trades are excluded are qualitatively similar. We nd that with no reporting delay and with half-spread earned on ending inventory, the fraction of nonpreferenced and internalized trades is the only variable negatively related to dealer pro ts. However, in the other three versions of the regression, no one of the four variables shows any systematic relationship. Once again the adjusted R 2 s are of similar magnitude four to six percent. This indicates the absence of any relationship between dealer pro ts and the composition of order ow is not sensitive to the presence of portfolio trades in our sample.
On the whole, we nd that the regression results do not lend support to the prediction of the collusion hypothesis that preferenced order ow should be more pro table than nonpreferenced order ow. However, our ndings are consistent with the`costly negotiation with heterogeneous dealers and customer-dealer relationship' hypothesis.
We i n vestigate directly the extent of trading relationships between brokers and market makers. Towards that end, we rank brokers by turnover and select the top 19 brokers who are not a liated to any market maker. We examine how these 19 brokers distribute their order ow across the 19 market makers. We nd evidence of strong trading relationships. For each broker, when we rank the market makers in descending order of that broker's business, we nd that, on average, the top market maker executes 27 of the business minimum 18 percent, maximum 92 percent. For expositional convenience, if we call this market maker the most favored marker maker, then in total we nd that six of the nineteen market makers happen to be the most favored market makers of at least one of the nineteen brokers. The largest second largest market maker happens to be the most favored market maker of nine six brokers. Collectively, these six most favored market makers execute over 85 percent of the order ow of the brokers. This suggests that the brokers allocate a vast majority of their business to a handful of market makers.
In the absence of any trading relationships, we expect the brokers to distribute the order ow more or less independently across the market makers. Pearson's test of association attempts to capture this notion of independence. For this test, since we know the total business executed by each broker and each market maker, under the assumption of independence, we estimate bivariate probabilities for broker i and dealer j; P i;j = P i P j , where P i P j is the Pound Sterling value of broker i's dealer j's business expressed as a fraction of total business B executed by the 19 brokers with the 19 market makers. We compute expected values of the distribution of business E i;j = BP i;j under the assumption of independence. We calculate deviations of observed distribution from expected distribution O i;j , E i;j , compute O i;j , E i;j 2 =E i;j , and sum it across the 19 brokers and across the 19 market makers. This statistic in our case is distributed Chi-square with 324 19 minus 1 times 19 minus 1 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the test-statistic at the one percent level equals 268, while we obtain a test-statistic value of 17,803. This further supports the notion of trading relationships on the LSE. In this section we investigate whether there exists any evidence in support of the claim that practices like preferencing and internalization worsen the quality of execution for the order ow as a whole. In particular, we examine whether the average inside or average e ective spread in a given stock is related to the fraction of trades that are preferenced and or internalized in that stock. To implement our cross-sectional test, we compute the average inside spread and the average e ective spread twice the mean e ective half-spread in each of our sample stocks. We also measure the fraction by value of preferenced and internalized trades, preferenced and noninternalized trades, nonpreferenced and internalized trades, and interdealer trades in each stock. We regress the average inside spread and the average e ective spread in each stock on the fractions of these four types of order ows in that stock while controlling for the well-known determinants of spreads like volatility, turnover rate, price of the stock, and numberof dealers making market in that stock. Speci cally, we run the following regression assuming no delay in reporting of trades, and for robustness, assuming a ve minute delay in reporting of trades. Table VII summarizes the results of our regression using average inside spread and average e ective spread, with and without delay in reporting of trades. In case of no delay in reporting of trades the contemporaneous touch panel, relative proportions of the di erent types of order ow in a stock are unrelated to the average inside spread and average e ective spread in that stock. For both inside and e ective spreads, other independent v ariables are highly correlated with spreads as suggested by the 62 percent and 65 percent R-squares.
The results look marginally di erent under an assumed trade reporting delay of ve minutes. In the case of the inside spread regression, we nd that the fraction of preferenced and internalized P&I trades and to a lesser extent the fraction of preferenced and noninternalized P&N-I trades and the average inside spread are positively related. This is consistent with the notion that preferencing reduces the incentive to narrow quotes. In addition, we nd that the average inside spread and fraction of interdealer trades are negatively related. This suggests that in stocks with high degree of interdealer trading, market makers are able to share risk more easily and are willing to post tight quotes. This evidence supports the recent models of inter dealer trading Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan 1996 and Werner 1997 and also further corroborates the empirical evidence in Reiss and Werner 1998.
Similarly, in the case of the e ective spread regression and under an assumed reporting delay of ve minutes, the average e ective spread and the fraction of preferenced trades both internalized and noninternalized are positively related, potentially re ecting worse execution received by preferenced trades compared to nonpreferenced trades. The negative relationship between average inside spread and fraction of interdealer trading suggests that stocks where it is easier to lay o the inventory risk in the interdealer market, dealers are willing to charge a lower spread. However, none of these variables which appear signi cant under an assumed reporting delay of ve minutes, show any relationship under no reporting delay. Moreover, the di erences in R 2 s are very small suggesting that these e ects are at best marginal and economically not very signi cant.
To examine the sensitivity of our ndings to the presence of portfolio trades, we rerun Regression 5 excluding portfolio trades results not reported. We also rerun Regression 5 including all trades but specifying the fraction of portfolio trades in a stock as an additional independent variable. In neither of the cases do we nd any consistent and signi cant relationship between the fractions of the di erent types of order ows in a stock and the average inside or the average e ective spread in that stock. This suggests that our nding is not sensitive to the presence of portfolio trades.
Thus, these regression results do not lend support to the prediction of the`collusion' hypothesis that stocks with higher extent of preferencing or internalization should have wider inside or e ective spreads. These results, however, are consistent with the`costly negotiation with heterogeneous dealers model' of Rhodes-Kropf 1997, where dealer pro tability is unrelated to the fraction of customers who receive price improvement. On the whole, the evidence does not show any consistent and signi cant relationship between the extent of preferencing and or internalization in a stock and the inside spread or the e ective spread in that stock.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we measure the execution quality and dealer pro ts for various types of order ow on the LSE. We nd that preferenced order ow receives worse execution than nonpreferenced order ow while internalized order ow receives better execution than noninternalized order ow. Interestingly, w e do not nd any signi cant relationship between the trading pro t of a dealer in a stock and the fractions of preferenced and or internalized order ows executed by that dealer in that stock. These ndings are robust to potential delay in reporting of trades and presence of portfolio trades in our data.
Our results neither lend support to the`collusion' hypothesis nor to the`free option in quotes' hypothesis. However, they are consistent with`costly negotiation with heterogeneous dealers and customer-dealer trading relationship' hypothesis. If customers require immediacy, they do not pay the cost of negotiating quotes and go to their regular dealers irrespective of their quotes. If customers are more patient, they search and negotiate for the best price and receive better execution. As a result, preferenced order ow pays a higher spread margin.
Our results on overall dealer pro ts indicate that market makers on the LSE earn a trading pro t that is not signi cantly di erent from zero at least in our sample period. This seems to suggest that practices like preferencing and internalization are at best necessary but not su cient to lead to collusive pro ts. Our results also suggest that dealers make money on small and large trades but lose money on medium-size trades. These di erences are mainly due to the larger negative position margins on medium-size trades suggesting that these trades represent informed order ow a nding consistent with Barclay and Warner's 1993`stealth trading' hypothesis.
The absence of any signi cant cross-sectional relationship between the extent of preferencing or internalization and the average inside and average e ective spread in a stock is consistent with the claim of Christie and Schultz 1996 that these practices are not su cient to explain the wider spreads in dealership markets like the Nasdaq. Since in our sample there are more than two market makers in every stock, our results are also consistent with the ndings of Bloom eld and O'Hara 1998 in a laboratory experimental market.
Before we conclude, we w ould like to relate our results with ndings of other papers. In terms of pro tability, our nding is consistent with the member rms' nancial performance report published by the London Stock Exchange. When we use Stoll's 1993 methodology to compute the trading pro ts, we nd that dealers earned a trading pro t of $220 million on a public turnover of $357 billion or about 6 basis points during all of 1994 with the months around the sample period reporting the worst trading pro ts since 1990.
25
Our evidence of`stealth trading' is consistent with the ndings of Hansch and Neuberger 1996 for 25 liquid stocks over October 1991 -March 1992 period. Finally, our results on execution quality are similar to those of Reiss and Werner 1993 and Board and Sutcli e 1995 pertaining to an earlier period.
Thus, our overall results do not seem to be highly speci c to the sample period under observation. They are, however, speci c to the London Stock Exchange and their generalizability t o other dealership markets like the Nasdaq remains an open question. More studies using data from di erent dealership markets are needed to con rm our conclusions.
Footnotes 1 See Macey and O'Hara 1996 for an interesting discussion of the legal interpretation of the term`best execution'. Other studies Kandel and Marx 1998 and Bloom eld and O'Hara 1998 focus on the precommitment i n volved in a preferencing agreement. Such agreements are unobservable to us as researchers. However, since these agreements involve routing of small orders, we are able to shed light on this issue by examining the quality of execution of retail-size orders.
2
Our de nition of internalization is synonymous with the de nition of preferencing in Section 510 of the 1996 Securities Improvement Act. The act de nes`preferencing' as the practice of a broker acting as a dealer on a National Securities Exchange, directing the orders of the customers to buy and sell securities to itself for execution under rules that permit the broker to take priority in execution over same-priced orders or quotations entered prior in time.' 3 In this paper we use the words dealer and market maker interchangeably as they are synonymous in dealership markets. 4 Battalio et al. 1997 do not nd any e ect of internalization of order ow on regional exchanges on the quoted and e ective spreads at the national level. They attribute their results partly to the degree of fragmentation being too small and partly to the data not being of su cient quality. In a laboratory experimental market, Bloom eld and O'Hara 1998 nd that preferencing has a signi cant e ect when there exist fewer than three market makers. There is no mandatory tick size on the LSE. As a norm, the prices are quoted in pence decimal quotes. More importantly, transactions on the LSE can and do take place at per share prices that are in fractions of a penny. In our sample, the average tick size corresponds to about 20 basis points, which is less than half of that on the NYSE and the Nasdaq in So anos' 1995 and Huang and Stoll's 1996 samples. For more recent comparison of trading costs on the NYSE and the Nasdaq, see LaPlante and Muscarella 1997 , Jones and Lipson 1996a , 1996b , Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997 and Barclay 1997 Barclay and Warner 1993 examine the price movements induced by trades. They show that a disproportionate amount of price volatility comes from intermediate size trades. They also show that the evidence on insider trading suggests that insiders use medium-size trades.
8
It has been argued that the SOES system on Nasdaq facilitates such picking o of quotes see Kleidon and Willig 1995 and Harris and Schultz 1997. 9 This implication of the inventory model that quotes are one-sided is shown to hold in Chan, Schultz 1995 and Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan 1998. 10 See Neuberger and Schwartz 1990 and Hansch 1997 for a detailed description of the LSE.
11
Source: Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1994, winter edition, pp. 72-73. 12 In August 1994, the FTSE-100 index actually comprised 102 stocks.
13
Recall that according to our de nition of preferencing the market maker could be straddling the touch or on the opposite side of the touch. Although, at rst glance, the fraction preferenced seems high, it may not be the case given the one-sided quote posting behavior of the market makers. For example, consider a stock which has seventeen market makers and assume that the customers go to their favorite dealer irrespective o f her quotes. If, on average, four of them post the lowest ask but not the highest bid, four of them post the highest bid but not lowest ask and remaining seven straddle the touch, then, on average, 12 of the 17 market makers will not be on either side of the touch. Therefore, in such a stock, the fraction of order ow preferenced will be12 17 or 70 percent. 14 When dealers act as brokers they may charge commission for providing brokerage services. Institutional customers who directly negotiate trades typically avoid this commission generally about 20 basis points; however, they incur the salary costs for employing personnel to negotiate their trades. The total revenue earned by the dealers consists of trading pro ts as well as brokerage commission. We compute the former in Section IV and discuss the relative importance of the latter in our concluding remarks.
15
Our measure of execution quality is thus related to the earlier work of Reiss and Werner 1993 on the LSE. Like them, we consider the variation in execution quality across order sizes, and we also consider whether the trade is preferenced or not and whether the trade is internalized or not. In addition, we examine the pro tability of di erent types of order ows.
16
The correlation structure of the data is similar when we exclude portfolio trades.
17
Some of the large trades on the LSE are executed as protected trades which are worked over time and reported when complete Franks and Schaefer 1995. For these trades, the preferencing dummy i s l i k ely to be misclassi ed. However, this problem does not apply to trades in the zero to one NMS category for which the quotes are rm.
18
All t-statistics reported in this paper are based on White 1980 heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.
19
Our results on slope coe cients of size and touch are consistent with the ndings of Reiss and Werner 1993. 20 These trading pro ts are a part of the total revenue earned by the dealers. They also earn commissions for providing brokerage services. However, since there are a large numberof independent houses who compete with the dealers for the provision of these services, one does not expect the dealers to beable to charge excessive commissions to subsidize their dealing activity. See concluding remarks for the relative magnitudes of trading pro ts and commissions from 1991 to 1996. 21 Inventories can bevalued at the inside quote midpoint, the current best quote on buy or sell side, the last trade price, etc.
22
In total we obtain 1,276 observations for dealer pro ts.
23
See Reiss and Werner 1998, and Naik and Yadav 1996b for empirical investigation of interdealer trading on the LSE.
24
Pearson's test of assocition does not control for the di erences in the propensity o f market makers to post competitive prices. However, the nding that 66 percent of the trades are executed by dealers not posting the best price see summary statistics table in 0-1 NMS as well as all trades categories suggests that brokers have strong trading relationships with dealers.
25
The trading pro ts from 1991 to 1996 are as follows: 13 basis points in 1991, 10 basis points in 1992, 13 basis points in 1993, 6 basis points in 1994, 9 basis points in 1995 and 11 basis points in 1996. In addition the dealers also earned commissions leading to a total revenue of 25 basis points in 1991, 20 basis points in 1992, 24 basis points in 1993, 19 basis points in 1994, 20 basis points in 1995 and 22 basis points in 1996. Hansch, Oliver, Narayan Y. Naik, and S. Viswanathan, 1994, Trading pro We aggregate the margins earned by individual dealers and obtain the mean overall margin OM earned by all the dealers in our sample. The mean overall margin OM is simply the trading pro ts earned by all dealers divided by the total public turnover collectively executed by them. We nd that although the market makers charge SM an average spread margin of 23 basis points, they lose PM 27 basis points while unwinding the trades and overall make OM a loss of 4 basis points.
To understand how the overall margin varies across trade sizes, we segregate all public trades into three size categories: Small 0-1 NMS, Medium 1-6 NMS, and Large 6+ NMS and compute the overall margin for each size category as described above. If we assume that dealers earn a half-spread on the nal inventory, then we nd that that they earn 24 basis points on small trades, lose 16 basis points on medium-size trades and break even -1 basis points on large trades. Overall the dealers lose 4 basis points. If we value the ending inventory at the touch mid price, then corresponding margins turn out to be 22 basis points, -19 basis points and -6 basis points, respectively, and overall the dealers lose 6 basis points. We note that this calculation does not include any commission on portfolio trades. If we allow for a 20 basis point commission on portfolio trades, we nd that they just about break even on the overall order ow. where TP j s is the trading pro ts of market maker j in stock s expressed in basis-points of her total turnover. Pref&Int F rac j s , Pref&NonInt F rac j s and NonPref&Int F rac j s respectively denote the fraction of public order ow executed by market maker j in stock s that is preferenced and internalized, preferenced and noninternalized, and nonpreferenced and internalized. Stock-Dummy j indicates the dummy for sample stock. All estimates are expressed in basis points. where Spread is the average inside and the average e ective spread in stock s expressed in basispoints of the midprice, and where Pref&Int F rac, Pref&NonInt F rac and NonPref&Int F rac denote the fraction of public order ow which is preferenced and internalized, preferenced and noninternalized, or nonpreferenced and internalized, respectively. Inter-Dealer Frac denotes the fraction of total order ow that is among dealers. Volatility i s the standard deviation of daily log returns scaled by 1=10000. Turnover is average daily total turnover in the stock. 
